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1. Introduction 
 
 
The response of the liberalised and regulated European electricity markets to supply security 
challenges remains a major preoccupation considering the supply security problems resulting 
from inadequacies in the regulatory framework or the shortcomings in the markets (Arriaga, 
2007; CEER, 2012). The electricity networks in Europe face the risk of significant damages 
and threats from high impact and low frequency (HILF) events. Such threats are partly due to 
the changing global security landscape. However, the likelihood and impact of threats are 
also exacerbated due to the growing market integration and cross-border interconnections 
among member countries in the creation towards a single electricity market. 
 
 
The HILF  events  can  occur from  natural  causes  (such  as  natural  calamities  and  severe 
weather conditions), accidents (such as explosions and nuclear accidents) and human 
conceived malicious threats (such as terrorist attacks, sabotage, vandalism and coordinated 
cyber-attacks) that can halt the functioning of the modern electricity systems (Hammond and 
Waldron, 2008; NERC, 2010). These events are characterised as having low probability of 
occurrence but with high potential to cause significant and long-term catastrophic damage to 
the power system and other essential services in the wider economy. The risks from HILF 
events can transcend other operational and reliability risks facing the electricity networks due 
their magnitude of impact (Nepal and Jamasb, 2013). 
 
 
Increasing the number and capacity of interconnections in the European electricity markets 
can facilitate the transmission of HILF risks from one transmission node to other nodes 
through the interconnector and create a 'ripple effect' or 'cascading failures' of economic, 
social and environmental damages post-events (Billington and Allan, 1988; Douglas, 2005). 
For example, supply side failures led to rolling blackouts, voltage reductions and public 
appeals for emergency conservation in California, Ontario, Chile, New Zealand, Brazil and 
India while major network failures in the Eastern and Western U.S. and Italy caused 
significant disruptions (Bailek, 2004). These technical failures can be attributed to investment 
inadequacy in new transmission and distribution infrastructures resulting from the design of 
regulatory framework for generating large-scale investments leading to insufficient response 
to forecasts of the required levels of investments. Hence, it is questionable if competitive 
electricity markets and incentive regulation of networks is consistent with achieving 
acceptable levels of electricity supply security (Joskow, 2007). 
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As such, the issue of how to treat and incentivise supply security investments under evolving 
regulatory framework is crucial and is gaining heightened importance among the EU energy 
regulators.  This is because the capabilities of the electricity systems to embrace the risks and 
threats facing the power networks are closely linked to the future of network regulation. This 
paper reviews the different approaches to regulate and promote network security in the light 
of the changing nature of network regulation from an input-based approach to an emerging 
output-based incentive regulation in Europe. We conceptualise network security as 
encompassing the conventional elements of electricity supply security such as short-run 
operational reliability; commercial reliability and long-run resource adequacy (see Joskow, 
2007) along with security threats from natural, accidental and malicious (or exceptional) 
 
events facing the networks (see Nepal and Jamasb, 2013) in the remainder of the paper. 
 
 
 
This paper assumes that addressing the network security challenges is a regulatory matter 
while network security can, alternatively, be viewed as an aspect of quality of service that can 
be achieved by incentivising the investments and innovation in the regulation of networks. A 
useful way to improve network security through regulation is by incorporating network 
security in the quality of service regulation. However, due to the nature of the network 
security, it is difficult to design an optimal regulatory framework or mechanism that accounts 
for all economic, technical, natural and malicious risks faced by the electricity networks. 
Designing an optimal and workable incentive laden regulatory mechanism that induces the 
networks to deliver the welfare-maximising levels of network security (even the conventional 
quality of service) is a difficult task (Sappington, 2005; Joskow, 2011) and beyond the scope 
of the present paper. 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
investment challenges facing the liberalised electricity markets in Europe. Section 3 discusses 
the current approaches to network security regulation and their subsequent effects on 
investment and innovation. The different regulatory options to address network security are 
discussed in section 4 as network regulation is changing from an input-based to an output- 
based incentive regulation approach. Section 5 presents an output-based incentive regulation 
framework to regulate network security. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Liberalisation and Investment Challenges 
 
 
 
Liberalisation and economic integration of the electricity sector must constantly adapt to 
emerging challenges in the operating environment of the electricity networks alongside 
improving their cost efficiency. Much of the existing electricity networks in Europe is aged 
and in need of replacement and upgrades (European Commission, 2006). The transition 
towards low-carbon economies and decarbonisation of energy sectors necessitates that the 
electricity networks undergo profound technical changes to accommodate the growing share 
of renewables and the continuing smart technological innovations in meeting the demand for 
a secure supply of electricity. 
 
 
The future electricity networks need to move from a passive to an active operation and design 
providing opportunity for end-users to participate as actors in the market by actively 
responding to real-time price signals and no longer basing their consumption decisions in the 
realm of inelastic demand (Joskow, 2012). The advent of smart grids and mobile electricity 
consumers (electromobility) has also signalled the demise of the long held assumption on the 
technological maturity of the electricity networks (Schiavo et al., 2013). These technical 
changes needs to be pursued within the context of electricity market integration and increased 
interconnections across the European electricity systems. 
 
 
The need to (a) replace existing network infrastructures, (b) expand network capacity to 
accommodate the growing share of distributed generation and renewable energy sources and 
(c) develop innovative infrastructures for greater end-user participation requires significant 
replacement and new investments and innovations in the transmission and distribution 
networks for securing electricity supply. However, the lack of adequate and timely 
investments has been a major regulatory and policy concern across the European electricity 
markets that have undergone a broader paradigm shift from state-ownership and vertical 
integration towards more decentralised and unbundled structures, competition, independent 
regulation and private ownership during the last two decades (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008; 
Sanyal and Cohen, 2009; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011; Newbery, 2012). 
 
 
Investment in the regulated electricity networks respond to the overall regulatory framework 
as well as associated institutional constraints (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996; Vogelsang, 2002; 
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2006). The networks as natural monopolies are regulated in terms of price, entry and access 
regulation (Newbery, 2002). Investments and innovation in the networks are not governed by 
market mechanisms as investment decisions do not rely on expected returns exceeding the 
cost of capital incurred. The under-investment in network infrastructures can aggravate the 
existing and new network challenges and risks facing the electricity systems. 
 
 
However, policies and measures to improve network security need to be effective from a 
policy viewpoint as well as being economically efficient. This task is considerably 
complicated by the 'low-probability and high-impact' nature of the accidental, malicious and 
natural threats. There are two pathways to address the network security challenges. The first 
pathway is achieved through regulatory agencies and economic regulation of networks by 
incentivising practices, investments, and innovations that enhance network security. The 
second path is to treat network security outside of economic regulation and at the security 
policy level where governments, as central planners, assume responsibility and instruct the 
sector in this matter. This is because network security is a public good with positive external 
effects and networks also networks exhibit monopoly characteristics. Hence, market failure 
that occurs justifies government intervention. We adopt the first pathway and review the 
different regulatory approaches to address and promote network security given the likely 
change in the nature of incentive regulation from an input-based approach to an output-based 
approach. 
 
 
3. Current Approaches to Economic Regulation of Network Security 
 
 
The main role of an independent sector regulator is to act as the guardian of public interest 
(Armstrong et al., 1994). Hence, the regulator aims to ensure that network utilities provide 
network security while pricing the associated services efficiently and equitably. These goals 
should be consistent with satisfying a break-even (or budget-balance) constraint for the 
regulated networks by allowing them to cover the costs of providing adequate security while 
restraining their ability to create productive and allocative inefficiencies through market 
power (Joskow, 2008). At the same time, the regulator is constrained to consider that the 
regulated charges are adequate to allow the networks to undertake new investments and 
innovation pertaining to network security while offering them incentives for maintaining and 
improving the production efficiency. 
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Incentive regime often aims to mimic the discipline of competitive markets in the regulation 
of network security (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). However, regulators are neither fully aware 
nor unaware about the cost, quality and demand characteristics of the network companies – 
i.e. regulators have imperfect and incomplete information relative to the regulated firms. This 
information asymmetry between the regulator and regulated companies creates potential 
problems associated with 'hidden action' (or moral hazard) and 'hidden information' (or 
adverse selection) in regulating network security, which, as a result, the regulator should 
effectively address in the mechanism design process. Using the principal-agent analysis, 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) showed that using a menu of cost-contingent regulatory contracts 
with  different  cost  sharing  provisions  could  be  optimal  considering  the  information 
asymmetry between the principal (the regulator) and the agent (the regulated network). 
 
The regulator is also constrained to avoid the bankruptcy of the regulated network company 
implying that the regulated prices should account for the possibility of high network security 
costs under conditions of information asymmetry. Hence, the allowed revenue (R) received 
by the regulated network company is the sum of a fixed component independent of actual 
network security costs (α) and the actual (or realized network security cost) (C) less the cost- 
savings undertaken by the regulated company. The cost sharing parameter (β) captures the 
extent to which the regulated network company's allowed revenue responds to realized 
network security costs only known to the utility. The sharing parameter is the incentive 
parameter and  provides  an  opportunity for the  firm  to  deviate from  the actual  network 
security costs by varying its effort level only known to the firm and increase profits. 
 
 
 
 
R = α + C - β C = α + (1- β) C (1) 
 
 
 
 
Under pure cost-based regulation, α = 0 and β = 0 implying that the allowed revenue of the 
network company is directly linked to its realized network security costs. The firm has no 
incentive to reduce its network security costs by exerting higher effort levels, which the 
regulator cannot evaluate. A strict cost-based regulation does not provide any incentives for 
the utility to engage in network security innovation in liberalised electricity sectors as there 
are no additional profits accruing to the network company by undertaking efficiency 
improvements through innovation. This is the case even when the companies do not bear any 
cost risk given that additional network security costs would be reflected in higher tariffs 
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(Bauknecht, 2011). On the contrary, cost savings arising from undertaking network security 
innovation such as by performing research and development (R&D) would lead to lower 
tariffs confirming that pure cost-based mechanisms do not give any incentive for network 
companies to become cost efficient. 
 
 
However, the provision of regulatory lag in practice means that the efficiency gains achieved 
through undertaking risk free R&D spending in network security can be retained and firms 
can earn extra profits for a period. The tariffs will be adjusted and the cost savings are passed 
to  the  consumers  at  the  regulatory  review.  This  provides  an  incentive  for  the  network 
company to pursue innovation under cost-based regulation (Bailey, 1974; Mayo, 1988). 
Hence, the impact of cost-based regulation on innovation related to network security can be 
positive overall as security related R&D spending becomes risk-free. No previous study has 
directly examined this relationship in the context of a liberalised electricity market structure 
across Europe. 
 
 
Under a pure price-based regulation, α = C* and β = 1 implying that the allowed revenue of 
the network company is not linked to its actual network security cost. The company has full 
incentive to pursue cost savings and expand its profit. C* is the regulator's assessment of the 
'efficient' costs of the highest type (Joskow, 1974; 2011). The regulator can apply a Bayesian 
or non-Bayesian mechanism to determine the value of C*. Modern non-Bayesian mechanism 
to estimate C* usually involve benchmarking using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) techniques (Coelli and Perelman, 1999). 
 
 
The separation of underlying own costs of the regulated network company with the allowed 
price provide strong incentives for inducing greater managerial effort and thereby improve 
cost efficiency to increase profits. The individual company and its managers have the highest 
powered incentives to fully exploit their cost opportunities by exerting the optimal amount of 
effort and eliminate the costs associated with managerial moral hazard (Brennan, 1989). 
However, the regulator needs to set an ex-ante price that is adequate to satiate the companies 
with high network security costs given that the balanced budget constraint provides the firms 
with opportunities to extract rents at the expense of the consumers and the society. The cost- 
reducing incentives imply that price-based mechanism is efficient for short-run efficiency in 
operating cost of network while not being desirable for short and long run network security 
investments in theory and practice (Helm, 2009). 
EPRG 1405 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, theory suggests that price-based regulation promotes innovation such as those 
required for network security (Magat, 1976; Clemenz, 1991) while Kahn et al. (1999) argue 
that incentive regulation such as 'price-cap' or 'revenue-cap' can undermine the development 
of network security innovation even though there is considerable incentive for companies to 
improve efficiency through technical change. This is because undertaking security related 
R&D and other innovative investments become risky under-price-based mechanism while 
companies are incentivised to reduce costs. Hence, the dynamic efficiency improvements 
through technical changes and requiring short-term expenditures may take a backseat due to 
static efficiency improvements prompted by incentive regulation (Bauknecht, 2011). There is 
some evidence that price-based regulation has led to a decline in R&D expenditure and 
innovation across the European electricity sectors (Holt, 2005; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). 
 
 
Hence, the regulatory mechanisms for network security can theoretically vary between a pure 
cost-based mechanism and a pure price-based mechanism and be regarded as two polar cases 
of regulatory mechanisms. In practice, 0 ‹ α ‹ C* and 0 ‹ β ‹ 1 such that β acts as a sliding 
scale factor between a pure price cap and a pure cost pass-through in a performance based 
regulation. Table 1 presents the (generalised and overall) major economic attributes, 
limitations and trade-offs associated with pure cost-based and price-based regulation. The 
economic  properties  suggest  the  problems  of  information  asymmetry  and  economic 
efficiency arguments leading to the paradigm shift from cost-based regulation towards price- 
based regulation. 
 
 
For example, rate-of-return regulation contributed to overinvestment and inefficiency in 
operating cost while RPI-X produced the opposite effects of too little investment but with 
operating cost efficiency in the UK (Helm, 2009). A strict cost-based regulation leads to 
excess or gold-plated network security (Averch and Johnson, 1962) due to overinvestment or 
overcapitalisation. In contrary, a strict price-based regulation leads to too little network 
security if quality and reliability (or network security) are not suitably defined due to high- 
powered cost killing incentives among network companies. Ter-Martirosyan (2003) and Ter- 
Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) showed that, in the absence of service quality controls within 
incentive regulation, incentive regulation led to deterioration of service quality in the US 
electricity networks. This implies that the level of network security delivered by a regulated 
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monopoly supplier can decline if the regulated prices are not allowed to 'increase as the 
 
network incurs greater costs to improve the service quality it provides' (Sappington, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions \ Regime 
 
Cost-based regulation 
 
Price-based regulation 
Motives Provides incentive to declare costs but 
not optimize the process 
Provides incentive to optimize 
the process 
Information asymmetry Moral hazard Adverse selection 
Static efficiency Allocative efficiency can be achieved 
but not productive efficiency 
Productive efficiency achievable 
but not allocative efficiency 
Long-run efficiency 
(assuming a fixed cost 
structure) 
Long-run allocative efficiency can be 
achieved but not productive efficiency 
Long-run productive efficiency 
can be achieved but not 
allocative efficiency 
Investments Incentivised as capital employed earns 
a return (but not efficient though) 
Not incentivised (given cost 
reduction motives and risks) 
Innovation Overall incentivised as R&D is risk- 
free 
Overall not incentivised as R&D 
is risky 
Price setting provision Ex-post Ex-ante 
Information requirement 
for the regulator 
Relatively high but easy to implement Low but relatively difficult to 
effectively implement 
Regulatory lag Endogenous and relatively short Exogenous (set ex-ante) and 
relatively long 
Macroeconomic impact Can be inflationary Can be non-inflationary 
Table 1: Generalised and overall effects of cost and price-based regulation 
 
Source: Authors' own compilation based 
 
 
 
Hence, the regulator needs to find a balance between these two extreme regulatory regimes 
and assess a possible combination of the two regimes to ensure efficiency and productivity 
with satisfactory security level accounting for all security risks exposed to the electricity 
systems.  Figure  1  depicts  the  optimum  level  of  network  security  considering  that  the 
reliability level reflects the consumers' priorities. The optimum level of network security is 
attained when a profit maximising regulated network company expands network security to 
the point where marginal benefit of additional network security to consumers equals the 
companies  marginal  cost  of  increasing  network  security  (Sappington,  2005).  The  total 
network costs constitute the fixed components (investment and innovation costs) and variable 
components (operating and maintenance costs, and interruption costs). The right-hand side 
and left-hand side regions of the optimum respectively denote overinvestment and 
underinvestment for network security. The need to balance costs-benefits of network security 
is a challenge while making network regulation more amicable towards ensuring optimal 
network security. 
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Figure 1: Socio-economic optimization of network security 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
4. From Input to Output Based Regulation of Network Security 
 
 
 
Economic regulation of electricity networks initially involves the regulator setting the overall 
budget available to network companies using cost or revenue based approaches. The input 
based approach focuses on the cost or revenue associated with specific investments to be 
made. The determination of the budget is often refined through the use of benchmarking in a 
revenue/price cap framework. The resulting budget can then be modified with inclusion of 
performance incentives based on measurable outputs. Hence, incentive regulation of network 
security can either target the network security inputs i.e. costs/expenditures (input-based 
approach) or network security outputs or performance (output-based approach) of the utilities 
such as the number and frequency of interruptions.. 
 
 
The  output-based  approach  is  characterized  by  complete  autonomy  of  the  networks  in 
deciding the network security investments and innovation to be undertaken during the 
regulatory period (Benedettini and Pontoni, 2012). The role of the regulator is limited to 
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defining a set of network security related outputs performance standards while the network 
chooses  the  technology  to  meet  the  security  related  performance  standards  at  the  least 
possible costs. Over or under performance of the network companies with respect to security 
related network outputs is accompanied by appropriate incentives (or rewards) and penalties 
respectively. This incentive structure is in line with the theory of optimal incentive scheme 
when quality is verifiable (Laffont and Tirole, 1989). 
 
 
An output-based regulation evaluates the firm’s performance in terms of quantity and quality 
of delivered outputs and gives incentivizes to improve these levels (Vogelsang, 2006). The 
output-based approach is also efficient in addressing the problem of asymmetric information, 
as  the  regulator  requires  less  information  on  the  network  company's  inputs  with  this 
approach. For example, the regulator would only specify the appropriate level of network 
security performance standards as the output in an output-based approach while in an input- 
based approach, the regulator would specify the scale, location, and type of investments 
required to achieve the output (Frontier Economics, 2010). For example, the new regulatory 
scheme proposed by Ofgem as the RIIO (Revenue = Innovation + Incentives + Outputs) 
model and the existing output based incentives for service quality regulation in Italy are good 
examples of output-based regulation. 
 
 
However, the output-based approach requires the regulator to properly ex-ante define and ex- 
post measure network security. This implies that output-based incentive regulation requires 
high output observability on the network security outputs of the regulated network company 
as the output-based approach to network security regulation is only applicable when clear 
metrics of network security outputs are available (Glachant et al., 2013). 
 
 
The input-based regulation involves a strong regulatory influence in defining the production 
function of the network companies as network companies are not responsible for choosing 
the most cost-effective investments that improve their performance such as in network 
security. The regulator defines the size, the quality, the timing and the location of the 
investments  towards  meeting  certain  level  of  network  security  under  an  input-based 
approach. Hence, an appropriate regulatory regime to promote network security may require 
adapting both cost-based and price-based regimes to deliver the regulatory objective of 
increased network security rather than comparing and making a choice between them. Table 
2  highlights  important  properties  and  characteristics  of an  input-based  and  output-based 
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approach  of incentive  regulation.  Both  approaches  can  be used  to  regulate the network 
 
security related costs. Some specific regulatory options are discussed below. 
 
 
 
Dimensions \ Types Input-based approach Output-based approach 
Ease of implementation Relatively difficult due to high 
informational requirement 
Relatively easy due to low 
informational requirement 
Usefulness For pursuing specific (or 
strategic) types of investments 
For providing investment incentives 
related to performances 
Applicability within/across 
 
sectors 
Particularly applicable when a 
clear performance metric is not 
available and is applicable to 
all network industries 
Applicable when clear performance 
metric for outputs are available and is 
applicable to other network industries 
depending on availability of suitable 
measure of outputs 
Operational control Regulator has greater control 
over network companies 
operational conduct 
Network companies have greater 
control over its operational conduct as 
long as the output targets are met 
Technology specification Regulator sets the technology 
the network companies use by 
governing inputs 
Network companies are responsible 
for choosing the technology that best 
meets their performance targets 
Stakeholder focus Focuses more on network 
companies with incentives 
provided for cost efficiency 
improvements and possibilities 
to extract informational rents 
Focuses more on consumers (or the 
demand-side) with the network 
companies being able to meet 
consumer preferences at the least 
possible cost 
Table 2: Generalised properties of input and output-based incentive regulation 
 
 
 
4.1. Network security costs pass-through 
 
Cost pass-through is an input-based approach to incentive regulation. This implies treating 
the costs related to network security such that these are passed to final consumer in a price- 
based environment assuming that the regulator approves all security costs in the regulatory 
cost base. These costs are not subject to benchmarking as this would make the network 
companies appear less efficient in a comparative efficiency analysis (or benchmarking) 
relative to other networks. Hence, network security investment costs will be treated as 
operational expenditures of the network companies and subject to direct pass-through under 
normal price-based environment under this approach. 
 
 
The pass-through of network security costs in a price-based mechanism does not increase the 
controllable costs of the networks and do not need to result in efficiency improvements as 
these costs are not subject to the cost benchmarking exercise. However, innovative network 
security investments undertaken can help the network company become more efficient in the 
long run. Thus, the network can benefit from the increased price-cap and costs gap during the 
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regulatory period by undertaking innovative security investments, which the network 
customers (or network users) eventually finance. Such cost pass through has been applied to 
allowed R&D and other approved costs. For example, the Norwegian energy regulator NVE 
has recently allowed the networks to spend up to 0.3% of the book value of their assets on 
network related R&D. 
 
 
There is, however, a potential of network security investments being inefficient as these costs 
are kept outside of the benchmarking exercise.. The worst possible outcome under this 
approach is the risk of these strategic investments being both inefficient and ineffective. 
Hence, the network security related costs that can be passed through should be capped by the 
regulator. 
 
 
4.2. Network security costs capitalisation 
 
Under  this  input-based  approach,  the  network  security  costs  are  treated  as  capital 
expenditures (i.e. cost capitalisation) and are included in the regulatory asset base (RAB) and 
are depreciated in line with other assets. However, it can be difficult to include these costs in 
benchmarking as the statistical benchmarking techniques applicable to operating costs have 
not yet been developed for capital costs due to significant heterogeneity between networks in 
terms of the age of the assets, geography, service quality, lumpiness of capital expenditures 
and other considerations (Joskow, 2008). The capitalised network security costs can earn a 
rate-of return (or possibly extra rate of return) on any network security related expenditures 
irrespective of efficiency improvements that the networks experience. 
 
 
An alternative would be to include network security related capital costs in the benchmarking 
analysis by undertaking the efficiency analysis at the total expenditures (or total costs) level. 
Benchmarking of total network security costs creates a more equal treatment of capital costs 
and operational costs in efficiency analysis and thereby minimises the distortions from input 
choices in benchmarking. Total costs benchmarking can also allow for efficient trade-offs 
between operational and capital expenditures related to network security. However, 
benchmarking total network security costs may not adequately deliver the type of capital 
investments related for network security implying that network security capital costs may 
need to be treated outside the benchmarking analysis. 
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Capitalisation of network security costs would produce a twin effect in a price-based 
regulation that applies to operational expenditure with investments being cost-based. This is 
because  network  security  costs  are  both  taken  out  of  the  price-based  regime  while  the 
network companies can earn a rate-of-return on these costs. However, there is a risk of over- 
investment (or inefficient investment) in network security due to 'gold-plating' under this 
input-based approach. Likewise, increasing the network security expenditures does not 
necessarily lead to network security improvements unless the investments are useful. 
Capitalisation also offers incentives for network companies to shift and declare a major 
proportion of the costs as network security costs. This necessitates the regulator capping the 
network security costs that can be capitalised. 
 
 
4.3. Linking the revenue-cap to network security output criteria 
 
An output-based (or performance based) approach to incentive regulation provides impulse to 
investments aimed at improving network security related outputs. The revenue earned by the 
network company becomes more dependent on its performance or output in order to prompt 
active networks and innovation on network security. This is because, under this approach, the 
allowed revenue of the company is linked to the performance or outputs and not directly 
linked to the underlying own costs of the firm. A performance-based regulatory framework 
should incentivise the networks to out-perform specific network security outputs and thereby 
allowing the companies to recover some portion of the network security costs through higher 
revenue. 
 
 
Thus, the additional revenue allowance of the firm is based on the actual network security 
related outputs whereas any recovery of the network security costs in a price-based regulation 
would have to be through cost-savings relative to the revenue cap imposed by the regulator 
(Bauknecht, 2011). Output-based regulation can also be effective when the regulated network 
has to perform multiple tasks and the regulator is not aware of the associated costs ex-ante. 
However,  the  ex-ante  measurement  and  definition  of network  security output  criteria  is 
crucial and is a complicated task facing the regulator under this regulatory approach. 
 
 
4.4. Extending the regulatory lag 
 
The extension of regulatory lag provides longer-term incentives to security related 
investments. Extending the regulatory lags can incentivise the network company to benefit 
from reducing its costs below the set cap without undertaking any adjustments to the revenue 
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cap within the regulatory period. For example, the regulator of electricity and gas markets in 
Great Britain (Ofgem) is considering a new performance based model by setting a longer 
eight-year price control review period to be implemented for electricity distribution from 
2015. 
 
 
 
The extension of the regulatory lag prevents the company from passing the gains from 
undertaking security investments immediately to the consumers. Hence, the lag period 
between regulatory reviews can be deliberately used by the regulator to influence the network 
security investment propensity of the regulated network companies. However, the networks 
may have a tendency to delay the adoption of innovative network security related investments 
due to the long lag while there is a trade-off between efficiency incentives for the regulated 
network company and allocative efficiency associated with regulatory lag extension. The 
extension of regulatory lag can also have an adverse effect on the timing of network security 
related investments as network companies may continue to postpone the network security 
related investments and continue to retain the annual cost-savings. 
 
 
4.5. Regulatory holidays 
 
An alternative approach would be to temporarily exempt a certain part of the network from 
regulation. The revenue cap is lifted altogether and the network can charge monopoly prices 
under conditions of so called access or regulatory holidays (Gans and King, 2003). However, 
this approach may be too radical, as it requires intermitting tariff regulation rather than 
amending  existing  network  regulation  as  disused  under  the  input  and  output-based 
approaches to incentive regulation. The direct application of regulatory holiday in the 
electricity sector is not common although Ofgem's Innovation Funding Initiative (IFI) allows 
the complete pass-through of eligible costs to a certain limit. 
 
 
In  the telecommunication  sector,  the Australian  telecom  incumbent,  Telstra,  intended  to 
invest in a modern Fibre to the Home (FTTH) network in return for a regulatory holiday on 
its  access  charges  which  the  regulatory  eventually  did  not  approve  (Cave,  2007). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the theoretical extremes of cost-based and price-based regulation 
can be combined in different ways to address network security investments while the power 
of the incentive regulation to deal with information asymmetry and efficiency gains are 
relevant for generating investments in network security. 
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4.6. Direct compensation 
 
Ensuring network security may necessitate that network companies undertake specific cost- 
intensive measures such as cables undergrounding and adopting sophisticated technologies to 
protect the electricity systems against natural, accidental and malicious threats. These cost- 
intensive investments are risky and can be beyond the ability and willingness of the network 
companies to absorb the associated risks by investing into these endeavours. Hence, direct 
compensation schemes to network companies can turn them to being risk-takers from being 
risk-averse to undertaking these costly investments. However, who funds these compensation 
schemes needs to be established beforehand as the choice can usually fall between the 
ratepayers versus the taxpayers. The pragmatic approach would be that taxpayers fund these 
initiatives as network security is viewed as a public good and engaging the taxpayers may 
effectively address the free-riders problem. Thus, the direct compensation schemes need to be 
discussed and designed at the security policy level. 
 
 
5. Incorporating network security in service quality regulation 
 
 
 
As service quality regulation is poised towards a more output oriented approach, regulators 
are faced with the challenge of incorporating and treating network security threats from 
exceptional events in the incentive regulation mechanism. This is because identifying 
exceptional events on the basis of a statistical methodology is difficult given that these events 
are rare while declaring an exceptional event based on technical and administrative evidence 
can be complicated as the understanding of the exceptional event (or the HILF events) varies 
across  the  European  countries  (see  Appendix).  The  concept  of  exceptional  events  is 
commonly used across EU but is applied with different designations and meanings. The 
understanding and definition of 'exceptional events' varies between the EU member countries. 
Some countries adopt statistical approaches while others focus their definition on the causes 
of exceptional events. Therefore, it is not possible to derive a clear conclusion on situations 
where the concept is applicable and on how to distinguish between “exceptional events” and 
“normal interruptions” (CEER, 2012). 
 
 
The statistical methods to address the exceptional events in network security regulation can 
be based on the level of impacts caused by exceptional events or can be based on criteria such 
as the number of customers interrupted or the frequency and duration of the interruption. 
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However,  the  changing  focus  of  regulation  towards  an  output-based  approach  implies 
defining a network security adjustment parameter (Q*) as an output indicator for network 
security (such as a proxy indicator for interruptions caused by exceptional events). The 
economic incentives can then be calculated as a function of the difference between a target 
Q* and the actual (ex-post) Q* where Q* is an output measure of continuity of supply (or 
service quality) for long unplanned interruptions of at least 5 minutes. 
 
 
While data for exceptional events are less frequent and rare, considering long unplanned 
interruption of at least 5 minutes (which can be relatively frequent and relatively non-rare 
than exceptional events) can mimic the impacts of interruptions engendered by exceptional 
events while more data also being available for analysis. This is because some interruptions 
from exceptional events are long and affect a substantial number of customers. On the other 
hand, it might be advisable to use an average over several years instead of the values for one 
particular year if exceptional events are included. This would increase the stability of the 
indicator. For the transmission system reliability, other output indicators such as 'unsupplied 
energy' or AIT can be used. For example, in 2004, Ofgem developed incentive mechanisms 
targeted at various dimensions of distribution network service quality. A new incentive 
mechanism was introduced in 2005 that focused on transmission system reliability as 
measured by the value of energy not supplied (OFGEM, 2004). 
 
 
Hence, the allowed revenue or price path (Pt ) of the regulated network company is directly 
linked to an alternative price-cap formula where RPI is Retail Price Index, X is the efficiency 
gain (or the efficiency factor) and Q* is the network security adjustment parameter (or the 
network security output indicator). The annual values of the network security parameter Q* 
are calculated, ex-post on the basis of the network companies’ performances and can take a 
negative  or  a  positive  sign.  A  positive  value  of  Q*  implies  that  network  security  has 
improved more than required at the national level and vice versa. 
 
 
Pt = Pt-1 (1+ RPI – X+ Q*) (4) 
 
 
 
A  statistical  methodology  to  account  for  exceptional  events  in  incentive  regulation  has 
several advantages in terms of simplifying the administrative procedure, being easy to 
understand and reducing the implementation costs incurred by the network companies and the 
regulator. However, it may expose the regulatory model to some fallacies of benchmarking as 
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the target value output indicator (such as Q*) is obtained from benchmarking. This is because 
a consensus does not exist on the choice of input and output variables to be included in the 
benchmarking models while the appropriateness of including network security measures in 
benchmarking models is still a new concept. Nonetheless, a value of Q* can be obtained from 
national distribution companies while international benchmarking could be used to determine 
the value of Q* at the transmission level. 
 
 
The adoption of statistical methods to account for exceptional events will require 
harmonisation   of   network   security   indicators   and   data   collection   procedures.   The 
measurement rules can play a crucial role in ensuring fairness in network security regulation. 
It is also necessary that security data include information about the interruptions that are 
excluded and included together with all the information about those events that are treated 
specifically. However, exceptional events, with an apparent intuitive meaning, but in the 
absence of a clear definition of the manner in which it is being used can lead to 
misinterpretation (CEER, 2012). Hence, it is recommended that each country use the 
definitions as set out in their own regulation but in convergence with international standards 
to facilitate international comparisons. 
 
 
Hence, incentive regulation of network security, in practice, can be an evolutionary process 
where  one  set  of  mechanisms  is  tried,  their  performance  assessed,  additional  data  and 
reporting needs identified and refined mechanisms developed and applied (Joskow, 2011). 
The future applications of incentive regulation concepts towards network security can consist 
of elements of tradition cost-based regulation, yardstick regulation and high-powered price- 
based regulation together with a defined set of outputs. However, the large-scale investment 
requirements to make the networks active combined with the need to undertake strategic 
investments to protect the grids from accidental and malicious threats imply that the 
government may pursue network security objectives with public funding rather than shifting 
these costs to network users under the incentive regulation framework. This is because the 
private rate of return to network security investments can be lower than the social rate of 
return implying inadequate network security under incentive regulation. However, any public 
funding should be accompanied by a thorough cost-benefit or cost effectiveness analysis to 
improve the efficiency of expenditure on networks while the results and information 
associated with such cost-benefit (or cost effectiveness) analyses should be shared between 
countries. This implies that if network security is also a political issue, then economics of 
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delivering a desirable level of network security may need to take the back seat and other 
authorities apart from the regulator shall decide the premises of it. However, ample 
coordination among member countries at the federal level is required. 
 
 
The European Commission can strategically promote network security across the EU by 
monitoring and providing (access to) funding to security related important projects. The EC 
can initiate a Network Security Enhancement Plan (NSEP) that identifies the key projects 
crucial for network security improvements in the EU and finance these projects. The 
monitoring and funding of the network security related project from the European 
Commission will also place these projects and network security objectives in line with the 
overall aim of creating an integrated market for electricity in Europe. For example, the 
Priority Interconnection Plan (PIP) of the EC strategically promotes the development of 
trans-European networks by providing details and updates on the progress of the 42 projects 
of European interest (Kerner, 2006). The projects listed on PIP receive special funding 
consideration from the European banks. The European Commission can initiate similar 
arrangements for the development of network security. 
 
 
The design of instruments to promote network security should also consider any support 
outside regulation when determining relevant incentive parameters. For example, electricity 
regulators in Norway and UK address the quality of service regulation by incorporating the 
social costs of network interruptions (or consumer willingness to pay to avoid the interruption 
costs) in incentive regulation. Hence, promoting network security via incentive regulation is 
not only limited to the incentive regulation mechanism alone but should be understood in the 
broader energy and national energy security policy context. The policy-regulation interface 
pertaining to network security needs to be well understood in the face of changing network 
regulation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
 
Security of supply and energy infrastructure has become a priority policy for the EU energy 
policy-makers and regulators together with other energy policy goals of competitiveness, 
affordability as the European electricity markets continue to liberalise. While wholesale and 
retail electricity markets across Europe have become competitive with increasing market 
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integration, unbundling and market opening; network security issues still remain critical and 
difficult to effectively address across the EU. This is especially the case considering the on- 
going transition towards a low-carbon energy-economy, increasing digitalization of the grid, 
increased adoption of renewable energy and growing integration of electric vehicles in the 
grid amidst the lack of adequate investments in the EU electricity networks. 
 
 
This paper addressed the current issues and future options in regulating network security and 
the role the future network regulation can play in improving the network security in the 
European electricity systems. It suggests that the changing nature of network regulation from 
an input-oriented approach to an output-based incentive regulation can be made suitable to 
address the network security risks. The nature of changing regulation, emerging regulatory 
trends and the need to upgrade the European networks provide an opportunity to integrate 
network security objectives into these economic activities as well. However, this needs to 
take place in the coming years to maximize the ‘synergy’ effects and also make achieving the 
objectives more cost effective. The European Union may need to require the Member States 
to include network security objectives in their upgrade plans. 
 
 
The EU countries also need to harmonise the network security objectives and intensify 
coordination among each other irrespective of the network security goals being an incentive 
regulation matter or a policy matter. The output-based regulation of exceptional events will 
require defining and measuring relevant network security outputs which can be difficult for 
the regulator. This clearly remains a challenge. Such approach can also run the risk of 
suffering  from  the  regulator  micro-managing  the  conceptual  issues  and  assessment  of 
network  security.  Hence,  it  may be  desirable  that,  in  the  short  run,  a  'building  blocks' 
approach to network security regulation is adopted as demonstrated by the successful service 
quality regulation in Italy. 
 
An output-oriented, complex and forward looking regulatory framework such as the RIIO 
model  as  being  discussed  in  the  UK  can  be  employed  to  address  network  security  as 
regulators gain more experience and become capable through 'learning by doing'. Moreover, 
the regulation of network security should also be understood in its wider economic regulation 
and national policy context. This involves considering the investment requirements and 
innovation  challenges  combined  with  the  need  to  protect  the  electricity  networks  from 
natural, accidental and malicious threats. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Designation 
 
 
Concept 
 
Who 
classifies? 
 
Included in 
interruption 
statistics 
Eligible to 
receive 
compensation 
payments 
 
 
France 
 
 
Exceptional 
event 
simultaneous 
interruption for more 
than 100,000 end 
users 
 
 
TSO1 and 
DSO 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Finland 
  
 
The concept of 
exceptional event 
does not exist 
   Yes, but 
interruptions 
longer than 12 
hours are 
compensated 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
Force 
Majeure 
 
Natural disasters, 
terrorist attacks and 
war, legal and 
official orders 
 
Jurisdiction, 
National 
Regulatory 
Authority 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
Exceptional 
conditions 
periods 
 
Based on statistical 
exploration and 
computational 
algorithm by NRA 
 
 
 
DSO 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
Czech 
Republic 
  The concept does not 
exist 
   
Denmark Exceptional 
event 
Hurricanes and 
floods 
 
Regulator 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
 
Exceptional 
event 
 
 
Weather and non- 
weather related 
 
 
 
NRA 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes, only is 
some 
situations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1TSO stands for Transmission System Operator, DSO stands for Distribution System Operator and NRA stands 
for National Regulatory Authority. 
